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Abstract
Despite existing approaches and techniques for securing corporate information assets, information security
threats continue to challenge business and government. Research suggests that to improve the effectiveness of
information security a clear understanding of the organisational context is required. We have used stakeholder
salience and stakeholder networks lenses to identify key stakeholders who shaped the information security
processes of a large Australian financial institution. We have also examined how the interrelationships between
these stakeholders might impact on their role in a stakeholder network. Our research suggests that a number of
key stakeholders exist who require attention and engagement from those responsible for information security.
We also highlight several stakeholders that have traditionally been given lower priority, but should be seen as
more important due to their positioning and influence on the stakeholder network. We suggest that a better
understanding more concerted engagement with these stakeholders can assist information security teams in
achieving organisational security objectives.
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INTRODUCTION
Information security threats represent a major cost for organisations. Organisational boundaries have become
more porous and the use of new technologies, such as cloud computing, mobile devices and e-commerce have
increased the number of possible threats (Teller 2012). Despite recognition of the importance of the problem,
many large organisations struggle to effectively protect their information assets against cyber-threats.
Understanding the broad information security landscape is an imperative for successful information security
management. Stemming from the results of our research we propose that a number of key stakeholders exist that
need to be taken into account (in a concerted manner) by the information management teams within
organisations. We use stakeholder salience and stakeholder network lenses to examine and determine the
stakeholders and how their interrelationships impact on information security management practice.
In this paper we first present an overview of existing literature and examine current approaches to information
security, stakeholder theories and their use in information systems research. We posit that stakeholder salience
theory and stakeholder network perspective can offer a unique insight into examining information security
practices. We propose that identification and classification of stakeholders relevant to information security is
highly important, however these stakeholders need to be viewed through the lens of the totality of their complex
interrelationships and not just their individual interactions with the security function within the firm. We present
our findings from a single in-depth case analysis of a large Australian financial institution that shows how those
responsible for information security perceive key stakeholders in the information security landscape and how
these relationships have influenced their information security practice. We conclude by arguing that an
understanding of the key stakeholder relationships and the network effect from their interactions can allow
businesses to strengthen their ability to manage emerging threats and improve the way they interact with dynamic
organisational contexts for their information security solutions.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Despite existing and extensive research efforts in the information security domain, information security remains a
key challenge to modern organisations. On the software engineering side we see a continuous development of
technical solutions to ever-evolving cyber threats. Malicious actors, however, often outpace these developments,
forcing industry and the research community to defend, rather than proactively protect. This has led to a number
of studies focusing on the socio-technical aspects of information security to create governance frameworks,
policies and effective controls that can remain agile and dynamic regardless the threat landscape.
The last forty years have seen a steady evolution of approaches for addressing information security challenges
(Salmela 2008). From control checklists (Baskerville 1993) and risk-management frameworks (Dhillon and
Backhouse 1999) to a wide-spread use of information security standards (Siponen 2006). These approaches aim
to put in place governance and control frameworks that ensure a baseline level of protection for organizations
facing an ever-evolving landscape of threats. Despite many organizations seeing these approaches as a useful
starting point, many of these have been critiqued by both researchers and practitioners where contextualizing the
approach to individual organizational needs and dealing with unique circumstances and challenges is required
(Siponen 2003; Stytz 2007).
In dealing with the difficulties of security standards being too generic, many industry or sector-based standards
have evolved (Kankanhalli et al. 2003). For example ISO27011 and ISO27015 which offer guidance to the
telecommunication and financial services industries respectively have developed out of the ISO27002
information security standard. Further to these sectoral approaches, a number of maturity and architecture
frameworks have been developed to achieve alignment with business objectives and the business environment
(see for example SABSA). Nevertheless, those responsible for information security face daily challenges to
ensure that by applying good practice approaches they are adequately protected given their specific business
situation (Siponen 2005).
Engaging with the context implies an understanding of the multitude of actors and stakeholders that are involved
in shaping it (Hosking and Morley 1991). With increased numbers of outsourcing partners and contractors the
boundary of a firm is much harder to define than before (Kotzab et al. 2009). Therefore, it has become necessary
to better understand stakeholders involved in information security, and their relationships to information security
teams within organisations and with each other. Examining the roles and relationships of all those affecting and
affected by information security can offer opportunity for a clearer understanding of how modern firms deal with
information security.
Stakeholders have been a focus of research studies in a variety of disciplines. Stemming from the discussion of
corporate social responsibility (Freeman and Evan 1990), stakeholder research has examined a variety of ways
for identifying, classifying and engaging with organisational stakeholders (Donaldson and Preston 1995).
Stakeholders are classically defined by Freeman (Freeman 1984, p. 46) as ‘any group or individual who can
affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives’. Despite this broad definition, an
extensive debate exists on which actors can be seen as stakeholders and how engagement models can be
differentiated between different types of stakeholders (Mitchell et al. 1997).
Information systems research has also embraced the importance of stakeholder identification and management.
A variety of studies have looked at the necessity to examine stakeholders and their relationships in project
management (Elias et al. 2002), information system development (see for example (Pouloudi 1999; Pouloudi
and Whitley 1997)) and implementation (Boonstra 2006). These studies have ranged from examinations of the
role of particular stakeholder groups, to in-depth investigations of stakeholder relationships. They offer an insight
into how various groups might impact the use and placement of information systems within modern
organisations.
Information security research has had some exposure to the examination of stakeholder roles. However, most of
these studies have focused on the relationship between information security teams and one particular stakeholder
relevant to their activity. For example, some studies have examined malicious actors (Cavusoglu et al. 2005;
Galbreth and Shor 2010) or leaders (Chan et al. 2005). Others, have used broader theories, such as institutional
theory to examine the relationships with internal and external actors (Hu et al. 2007). However there is a need for
in-depth stakeholder evaluation in relation to information security practice. Such evaluation can offer insights
into key influencers on the security practice within the firm and as other stakeholder theories provide mechanisms
for more effective engagement and stakeholder management.
Building on over 20 years of prior research, Mitchell et al (1997) have proposed a theory of stakeholder salience.
Their theory is based on the premise that all stakeholders can be examined through lenses of power, legitimacy
and urgency. Where power is the ability to influence organisational behaviour, legitimacy is desirability and
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morality of actions and urgency is driven by time and criticality of the issue at hand. Each stakeholder could be
compared against these three criteria to identify their salience and categorised as high, medium or low priority.
Such categorisation can offer managers a way to prioritise their engagements with stakeholders as well as offer
guidance on how these engagements could be conducted. Specifically in relation to security, examining power,
legitimacy and urgency allows for a practical, yet effective classification mechanism that might simplify
stakeholder interactions between information security teams and others within and beyond the organisation.
While Mitchell et al.’s (1997) theory provides a very useful lens to examine stakeholder relationships, some of
the criticism of stakeholder theories has been the lack of consideration for relationships between organisational
stakeholders that might affect how they interact with the organisation (Pouloudi and Whitley 1997). Therefore,
when it comes to information systems and information security, stakeholders cannot be examined in hub-andspoke relationships with the information security teams within a firm (Roloff 2008). Actors throughout the
information security landscape do not only interact with information security teams within an organisation, but
also influence each other, often changing or magnifying the role of particular stakeholders. In dealing with such
concerns, Kivits (2011) has integrated the idea behind stakeholder salience with discourse and stakeholder
network analysis to examine stakeholder engagements through a lens of complex multi-group interactions. We
propose using a similar lens and examine the engagement of information security actors within organisation with
relevant stakeholders. Given varied strengths and frequency of inter-stakeholder interactions, their positioning
within the network can impact on their immediate power, legitimacy and urgency, thus shaping their salience and
prioritisation requirements by information security managers.
We take a view similar to Pouloudi and Whitley (1997) that stakeholder relationships are dynamic and mutually
shaping, where an information security department sits within a complex network of actors that shape the broader
context of the information security field. Identifying who the stakeholders are, their relationship with information
security teams within a firm and their relationships to each other will allow for a more in-depth understanding of
actors and forces impacting on information security management within organisations. We therefore aim to
address the following research questions:


Who are the different stakeholders relevant to organisational information security practice and how
could they be classified based on their salience?



How do the relationships between stakeholders shape the way they are perceived by information
security teams?

METHODOLOGY
We use an in-depth single case study approach as it offered us with an opportunity to make in-depth contextual
investigations of contemporary phenomena. This approach is suitable to answering how questions. We have used
methodological practices proposed by Walsham (1995), Eisenhardt (1989) and Klein and Myers (1999) to guide
our use of case study research. While some critics of a single case approach argue that it lacks depth and
replicability (Eisenhardt 1991), we agree with Dyer and Wilkins (1991) and consider single case research as
allowing for unique in-depth investigation of phenomena. It has also allowed us to closely examine the
relationship between the case organization, its context and the subjects of study. This has reinforced the richness
of description and understanding communicated by us (the observer).
With our research questions in mind, we selected a case based on previous research in information security. Prior
research has found that organizations in the financial services, telecommunication and utilities sectors present
rich cases for information security research due to their greater focus on information security threats and
protection (Chang and Yeh 2006). We chose an organization from the financial services sector. We also felt that
as Australian financial organizations have performed extremely well despite global economic challenges (Gluyas
2012) this would be an interesting sector to explore. Our case (we refer to as FinCo.) is a large Australian
financial institution. FinCo. provides a variety of financial and banking services to corporate and retail clients,
and operates both in Australia and overseas. The firm is structured around its various service lines, with its
support services teams belonging to separate departments. More than a hundred members of FinCo’s staff have
information security-related responsibilities, and are positioned mostly along reporting lines under the Chief
Information Officer (CIO).
We used semi-structured interviews as our primary method of data collection as this has allowed us to engage
with the field in an in-depth manner while being able to identify, clarify and discuss key findings during the
process of inquiry (Bryman and Bell 2007; Walsham 1995). For the research reported in this paper, we have
conducted thirteen hour-long semi-structured interviews with security and non-security staff of FinCo. We have
interviewed three senior managers, four middle managers/team leaders and six frontline analysts in various
security-related roles. The interviewees in security-related roles were part of various security teams positioned
within the organisation and tasked with ensuring that organisational information assets are protected. We used
field notes, public documents and internal documents to triangulate some of our findings. We have used
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purposeful sampling based on initial interviews to identify subsequent interviewees. We have followed the steps
proposed by Poulodi and Whitley (1997) and started by first identifying the ‘obvious’ stakeholders, adding
stakeholders from the literature and building our list through an iterative process of interview data collection,
analysis and literature comparison (Walsham 1995). We then used further semi-structured interviews to discuss
and examine the relationships of the identified stakeholders and the information security teams within FinCo. The
second round of interviews included some repeat interviews with key information security team members as well
as new interviewees to examine the strengths and the nature of stakeholder relationships. We then coded our data
using middle-range coding based on the categories suggested by prior research and an inductive analysis of the
data (Urquhart 2013).
Following the process suggested by Klein and Myers (1999) we treated emerging theoretical explanations with
suspicion and examined them from multiple perspectives. Through interviewing subjects both with information
security roles and non-security roles we were able to examine a multitude of views. While specific research
findings can only apply in sufficiently similar contexts (Yin 2004), we feel that the propositions that we lay out in
the discussion section will be of use to other complex organization’s facing information security challenges.

FINDINGS
Through a combination of literature analysis and initial exploratory interviews we have identified eleven
stakeholder groups relevant to information security processes within our case organisation. Three of these
stakeholders could be seen as internal, with the remainder positioned outside of the organisation. Using
Mitchell’s et al (1997) methodology of examining stakeholder power, legitimacy and urgency we were able to
classify the stakeholders as high, medium and low priority stakeholders. Using interviewee reflections we were
able to assign power, legitimacy and urgency values from very low to very high. Based on combination of these
factors, we were thus able to evaluate the priority and salience level based on the framework proposed by
Mitchell et al (1997). We have then focused on examining the relationship between these stakeholders and the
information security teams within the firm. Furthermore we were able to identify the extended relationships the
stakeholders have between each other and how such relationships affect their role in information security
management processes. Based on stakeholder interview triangulation, network effect was rated as either strong,
medium or weak, depending on the influence of the stakeholder network positioning.

High priority stakeholders
High priority stakeholders tend to have the most say in the direction organisational information security teams
take. Combining high power, legitimacy and urgency, stakeholders in this group need to be carefully managed
and engaged in order to ensure information security objectives are met. The majority of such stakeholders are
positioned within the organisation, or can often have a major impact on the businesses bottom line. Table 1
provides a summary of high priority stakeholders and their role in the broader stakeholder network.
Table 1. High priority stakeholders
Stakeholder

Power

Legitimacy

Urgency

Salience

Network effect

Senior
management

Very
high

High

High

High
priority

Strong. Strongly affected by customers, media,
and regulators. Have strong impact on internal
stakeholders

Core
business
teams

Medium

High

High

High
priority

Strong. Strongly affected by customers, often do
not involve security, even when necessary.
Important internal stakeholder.

Customers

High

High

High

High
priority

Strong. Do not directly interact with security,
but their behaviour is affected by malicious
actors, media and business unit teams. One of
the most important stakeholders in the network.

Senior management
Senior management is responsible for setting organisational objectives, including those relevant to security.
Being one of the most powerful actors within the organisation, senior management plays an important role in how
information security is managed and operated. By delegating the responsibility for protecting organisational
information assets, senior management ensures the ability of information security actors to engage with the rest of
the organisation. The ability of this actor to set priorities means that the rest of the organisation is driven by what
senior management considers being important.
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This ability demonstrates the extent to which senior managements’ actions are able to influence other internal
stakeholders. By signalling the importance of certain initiatives, such as information security awareness
programs, senior management is able to improve the interactions between information security teams and other
stakeholders within the business.
‘[The CIO] has some strong views around certain aspects of security and those absolutely colour what we are
doing from the strategy perspective and the same is true of some of the other senior business executives’ Senior
Security Strategy Manager
Senior management’s perception of other stakeholders and trends within those (such as media, competitors, and
customers) might impact on the priorities it sets for information security teams. However beyond the
organisation, senior management has a relatively low impact on other stakeholders in the network and the way
they relate to information security teams within the firm.

Business unit teams
Business unit teams are the major internal consumers of information security services. Information security actors
need to ensure that the remainder of the organisation complies with the existing policy and governance
frameworks. Business unit teams also frequently conduct initiatives and projects that necessitate information
security teams’ involvement, making the relationship with this stakeholder group vital to successful information
security management. The quality of this relationship impacts upon the effectiveness of such controls as
information security policy, success of awareness programs and the overall security culture within the
organisation.
‘to be more than just a ‘back office, we just make sure the patches are on the workstations team’ you then
actually need the really tight integration and relationships with the business units, you need to know what the
business is doing, you need to be sitting with marketing, you need to be chatting to the customer facing business,
you need to be speaking with our offshore subsidiaries about what their challenges are’ Security Manager
The priorities of this stakeholder are rather sensitive to the competitive landscape; however the stakeholder might
have limited exposure to information security processes. However if other stakeholders in the greater network,
such as customers or competitors focus or vocalise their focus on security, this might promote security as priority
for the business unit teams.

Customers
Customers play a key role when it comes to managing information security effectively. While the relationship
between customers and information security teams might not be as direct as for example a customer’s
relationship with business unit teams, customer trust is seen as one of the most important elements to support
brand image and equity for a financial organisation. In case of a security breach, malicious actors usually
compromise customer’s data and funds, which makes protecting such assets not only a legal requirement, but also
a business priority for information security teams.
‘We as an organisation need to live and breathe in the same world our customers live and breathe in, we need to
know how to connect to them, we need to know how they operate, and what they do.’ Senior Security Analyst
Furthermore, customers are one of the most dynamic groups in the stakeholder landscape with constantly
changing preferences and trends, which often require the business to move in new directions, potentially
exposing it to new information security risks (e.g. new mobile apps, online access, etc.) that need to be
effectively mitigated. They remain one of the most attractive targets for malicious actors within the stakeholder
network, and thus play a key role in interacting with the majority of other stakeholders.

Medium priority stakeholders
Medium priority stakeholders (summarised in Table 2) tend to have less urgency, power or legitimacy when it
comes to dealing with information security teams. This does not mean that they are not important. In fact a
number of stakeholders within this group, such as malicious actors, vendors and regulators are dynamic in their
roles and depending on the situation at hand and can become some of the highest priority actors within the
stakeholder network.
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Table 2. Medium priority stakeholders
Stakeholder

Power

Legitimacy

Urgency

Salience

Network effect

Malicious
actors

Very
high

Very low

Very
high

Medium
priority

Strong. Shape the behaviour of most actors in
the network. Target both organisations and
customers. Respond to changes in behaviour of
actors to behave rationally.

Vendors

Medium

High

Low

Medium
priority

Strong. Serve as a central point of information
and best practice sharing in the network.
Strongly affected by malicious actors.

Regulators

High

High

Medium

Medium
priority

Weak. Mostly passive and dormant, have very
high power if start to act

Auditors and
consultants

Medium

High

Medium

Medium
priority

Weak. Usually dependent on the organisation,
limited impact across the network

Support
services
teams

Medium

High

Medium

Medium
priority

Weak. Important internal stakeholder, with
limited impact on the network as a whole

Competitors

Medium

Medium

Medium

Medium
priority

Medium. Source of shared information, unusual
cooperative behaviours within the network

Malicious actors
Malicious actors can be considered one of the stakeholders with least legitimacy. Their goal is to enact breaches
and access organisational information assets. While not having legitimacy these stakeholders possess vast
amounts of power over information security teams as they are the key instigators of attacks against the business
and to some extent the ‘raison de’etre’ for any information security team.
The reach of malicious actors however does not simply span the organisation itself. They are key to the overall
stakeholder network, driving the behaviour of all the participants of the network. Consistent with prior research
(Galbreth and Shor 2010), malicious actors can be seen as relatively rational actors, continuously evaluating costbenefit trade-offs and thus often targeting the weakest link in the greater stakeholder network.
‘We are an attractive target; we have a large customer base, who transact over the internet – that is appealing
to cybercriminals. So there are definite challenges and we are a target of choice for people who want to take
money out of someonelse’s account without having earned it or worked for it.’ CERT Analyst

Vendors
Vendors provide the organisation with software and hardware. Information security teams are highly dependent
on security vendors in order to deliver a high quality level of protection. Given the dynamic and ever-evolving
nature of the industry, the organisation is unable to continuously develop responses to new and untested threats
and thus requires the products and innovations offered by vendors to stay up-to-date with their defences. Vendors
collaborate very closely with information security teams in responding to new and emerging threats. Bidirectional learning and collaborative development of solutions is often characteristic of this relationship.
‘You have to be actively engaging back in the industry and then trying to push the industry in the direction that
you want them to get to.’ Security Delivery Manager
In addition to their traditional role, vendors serve as a conduit for exchanging information and intelligence about
the practices of malicious actors, as well as security practices of other businesses. This places vendors in a unique
position and while being a medium priority stakeholder, vendors are one of the most important actors across the
whole stakeholder network. This means that other actors have also have a close relationships with this
stakeholder, often involving information and practice exchange, mutual support in intelligence initiatives and
new product development.

Regulators
Regulators hold considerable power over the organisation and can impact what happens within its information
security management processes. In Australia, regulators differ in each industry, with financial services being
regulated by Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA). While the regulator might intervene in case of
major issues, it usually serves a more passive role, issuing guidance in relation to information security (see
Prudential Practice Guide PPG 234 Management of IT Security Risk), rather than enforcing particular
approaches. If however, the regulator might need to intervene, it will become one of the highest priority
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stakeholders in the network as it has the power to stop the organisation in conducting its operations (this can be
done to other financial institutions as well).
‘So guidance from a regulator really tends to be interpreted not as “this stuff you might want to think about”,
it’s more - you need to make sure this is covered’. Security Policy Manager

Auditors and consultants
These stakeholders can be seen in a more advisory capacity, offering support to the business and providing
guidance on ways to manage information security. When called upon, these stakeholders can exert considerable
influence, but normally remain relatively passive – most of the time engagement would be initiated by the
business. In case of auditors, information security management within the business could be influenced if
controls lack protection required by accounting regulators. Security auditors would also be used by senior
management stakeholders to provide external assurance of information security processes and become an
important stakeholder for the internal information security team.
‘They audit us here consistent with what they would expect the multinationals to have and they are massively
investing in compliance activities. So it’s sort of the macro and board level, people will come and tell them if
there are issues in security and there are concerns...and that absolutely gets the attention the CIO and the
Board.’ Security Governance Manager

Support services teams
If business unit teams are the main internal consumer, support services teams are one of the key stakeholders
within the business that can assist information security teams in achieving their objectives. While having only a
moderate amount of power and urgency, these stakeholders are often key to ensuring that information security
teams are able to protect the rest of the organisation. Support services teams are similarly positioned within the
stakeholder network, and the relationship between information security teams and support services teams is very
close and mutually beneficial.
‘[When it comes to other support services] there is a good alignment there, we are plugged into their guys, we
understand that we work on the security side of the fence and they are keeping the lights on, when it comes to
their services. So there is a good understanding there.’ Security Architect

Competitors
Generally for business, competition presents a long-term challenge in maximising organisational success.
However, when it comes to information security issues, the relationship with competitors is not so clean cut. With
malicious actors being the common ‘enemy’, it appears that information security teams from one financial
institution frequently share information with information security teams in competing organisations. This is
usually done informally, with sharing built around personal relationships. More extensive, often more formalised
relationships exist with organisations in the same industry but operating in a different market, such as Europe and
North America.
‘A lot of other really good information comes from understanding other people’s approach. I find that actually a
set of interactions with people outside of Australia is very useful as well. So we typically do on a yearly basis
meet with other people in similar roles in the US and Europe’ Security Manager

Low priority stakeholders
Low priority stakeholders (summarised in Table 3) tend to be the ones that are important to monitor, but would
rarely be actively engaged in dealing with information security processes within the firm. The ‘network’ effect
means that while low priority stakeholders might have little direct influence on information security teams, their
impact is magnified through their ability to influence perceptions and understandings of other stakeholders in the
network.
Table 3. Low priority stakeholders
Stakeholder

Power

Legitimacy

Urgency

Salience

Network effect

Media

Low

Medium

Low

Low
priority

Medium. Weak in relation to information
security teams, but have strong influence on
senior management and customers, which
magnifies their significance

Standard
setters

Low

High

Low

Low
priority

Medium. Provide information and common
language to stakeholders within the network
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Media
Media serves as an information source for events relevant to information security. Often, their focus is on
negative events, such as breach disclosure or privacy scandals. This means that while media can be seen as a
much less relevant stakeholder when it comes to information security teams, its importance lies in the ability to
shape the information landscape for the whole network and thus influence the behaviour of everyone involved. In
particular when it comes to influencing the perceptions of customers and senior management, media remains a
stakeholder that should be monitored, as it is able to highlight particular issues and thus motivate other actors to
exert pressure on information security teams with the business.
‘10 years ago the Boards were not even understanding security was something to ask about and if they were they
would ask the risk guy, now they want to ask the security guy, they read about it in the news all the time’ Senior
Security Manager

Standard setters and researchers
Standard setters play a relatively passive, albeit important role in the whole network. They compile best and
effective practice to develop internationally recognised standards and guidelines. A variety of frameworks exists
but they serve as a starting point for establishing and improving information security systems in the organisation
and therefore are of importance.
Specifically, we found that a number of standards play a pivotal role in creating a common language and shared
understanding between several stakeholders. While having little impact on some of the high priority stakeholders,
standards are considered to be highly useful in communicating information security issues with vendors, auditors
and regulators. Through creating a common language and shared baseline controls, standards simplify
interactions with these stakeholders and underpin long-term collaboration and relationships.
‘So if [potential suppliers] have gone through a certification framework themselves or if they have already got
an Information Security Management System that complies with the ISO view, it’s very easy - so the barrier to
entry for them is much easier to jump over.’ Security Analyst
As we have discussed, there are a number of stakeholders shaping how information security is managed in the
large financial institution we have studied. Stakeholder salience offers a way to classify these stakeholders as
high, medium and low priority and offers guidance to information security managers on how to engage with
these. Viewing stakeholders as a network of interdependent relationships also an explanation of the dynamic
complexity of influences across the various stakeholders involved.

DISCUSSION
Our findings demonstrate that examining stakeholders in information security management offers a unique
perspective on the influences and dynamic relationships that a firm’s information security professionals and other
actors experience as part of the security landscape. More broadly, however, it clarifies that any such examination
requires an understanding of the complex mutually-shaping relationships between across the entire network of
stakeholders. The positioning of some actors within the network places them in a unique role, and often changes
how they impact upon information security teams within the organisation.
Understanding stakeholder salience, that includes power, legitimacy and urgency offers an insight into how to
prioritise stakeholder groups and to develop more effective methods of engagement with them. Our findings of
high priority stakeholders are consistent with existing literature that focuses on organisational leadership (Chan et
al. 2005), business unit teams (such as research on the effectives and use of security controls within the
organisation) and customers (Herath and Rao 2009; Salmela 2008). Paying close attention to trends within these
stakeholder groups, can therefore underpin successful information security management.
Introducing a stakeholder network lens for the examination of stakeholder relationships offers insight into some
actors, whose roles might have been underestimated in prior research. One of the key stakeholders with strong
network impact are malicious actors. They are one of the most dominant stakeholders in the network and shape
the behaviour of others. As mentioned earlier, they often cause the defensive nature of many modern information
security teams. However, we have recently seen a shift towards more proactive protection mechanisms that
involve intelligence, counter-surveillance and other proactive prevention techniques that affect where malicious
actors might target their efforts.
The other stakeholder whose role is magnified by their relationship to others, are vendors, and in particular
security product vendors. Traditionally vendors would be viewed as a medium or low priority stakeholder,
because they play a regular supplier role and often dependent on the firm for their long-term business. However,
when it comes to information security, due to their unique positioning, vendors take on a much larger role of
information exchanges. They collect and share good practice in-between and within different industry sectors,
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they take charge of intelligence activities against malicious actors and they collaborate closely with information
security teams on controls and response development projects.
Finally, some low priority stakeholders cannot be underestimated. In particular the role of the media, due to its
ability to shape perceptions of senior management and customers. The media seems to play a much more
important role in information security management than previously thought. This poses a potential challenge to
take into account the behaviour of a low priority stakeholder as they influence other actors.
Understanding who the stakeholders are and how their interactions shape information security can allow for
greater clarity in understanding and adapting to specific organisational contexts. Engaging with stakeholders
from a perspective of a dynamic stakeholder network, rather than a more traditional view of ‘influencers’ can
also allow for a better understanding of the role of each stakeholder in shaping organisational information
security practices. Such views will inevitably shape approaches to the key areas in information security
managements, such as policy provision, awareness programs and training and internal governance approaches.

LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
Our research has largely focused on the perceptions and understandings of stakeholders from the perspective of
the internal actors within our case. While our findings can offer a useful insight into the behaviours and
relationships of a variety of stakeholders, additional research into the detailed perspectives of other stakeholders
might bring important aspects of those interactions to light. Future research could also examine specific
interactions between stakeholders in the network and how various aspects of information security (e.g. policy or
awareness programs) are affected by these.

CONCLUSION
Having examined organisational information security from a perspective of stakeholder salience, we find that a
number of stakeholders exist that shape how information security is managed. These stakeholders have a varying
degree of influence on information security processes and therefore should be engaged in different ways. We also
find that the prioritisation of stakeholders might change based on their positioning within the greater stakeholder
network and specific circumstances impacting on the network. We find that while organisational leadership,
customers, internal business unit teams and malicious actors have been traditionally seen as important players in
the information security landscape, other lower priority stakeholders such as vendors and the media can take on a
role of greater importance due to their interactions with other stakeholders in the network. Our findings suggest
that understanding the dynamic nature of stakeholder relationships can allow information security managers to
better implement their priorities.
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